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21. INTRODUCTION
Recently, some have found it illuminating to think of Canada as a dictatorship. Jeffrey
Simpson’s recent book The Friendly Dictatorship (2001) asks if “Canada is de facto a one party
state” (p. x), noting that no party was capable of replacing the Liberals and offering an
alternative government in the last election.  Moreover, he suggests that “The Canadian Prime
Minister is more powerful within the [Canadian political] system than any democratically elected
leader in other advanced industrial countries” (p. 4).   
Donald Savoie’s work (1999a and b) may have been the inspiration for Simpson’s
musings.  His work focuses on the power of the prime minister within the government and not on
the dominance of the Liberal party per se.  Both authors agree that the process of centralizing
power in the Prime Minister’s Office -- a practise which Savoie labels “Court government”-- 
seems to have reached its apogee under the Chretien government.  
A third line of thought which has received considerable attention lately is that Canada is
becoming undemocratic in a different way, namely through the power of unelected judges to
make policy as a result of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Thus an influential recent book
by the political scientists F.L, Morton and Rainer Knopff (2000) suggests that Canadian policy is
increasingly being made through “the Court Party”, the name they give to various organizations
which increasingly push their agenda through court challenges. 
Can we use a model of  dictatorship to understand Canadian politics?  Does this  give us
any new insights into how it functions?  To an economist, what makes an analysis  interesting is
not its exactness to real life.  Economists know that the usefulness of a model is only partly
3related to the plausibility of the assumptions used in it!  No, what makes a “model” or way of
thinking interesting is if applying  it yields insight. 
This paper thus explores three questions: 
1.  Is there some sense in which Canada can be likened to a dictatorship? It is interesting
to look at Canada as if it were a dictatorship and compare how it functions  to the functioning of
real world dictatorships. I compare the workings of the Canadian polity with regimes like the
Former Soviet Union, South Korea under the generals, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and other
unsavory examples of the genre
2.  If Canada is not a dictatorship, how can this be explained, since at the federal level
Canada currently appears to lack what many take to be the sine qua non of democracy, namely
elections in which the ruling party faces a genuine alternative government which is capable of
defeating it in the polls?  
3. Are there circumstances where Canada could become more like a dictatorship? In
other words, what are the threats to Canadian democracy?  I consider four phenomena which
have been alleged to threaten democracy recently: (1) The use of the Charter by judges to make
law; (2) Declining trust or “social capital”, both among citizens, and by citizens in the
government, a phenomenon much talked about recently in the United States, most notably by
Robert Putnam in his book Bowling Alone, and generalized to other countries in subsequent
work by Putnam and others (see for example the papers in Pharr and Putnam (2000); (3)
Globalization;  and (4) The proximity and behaviour of the United States. 
One key to understanding these issues is not to repeat the error made by many in popular
culture, common in much of social science and of which my own discipline, economics, is
4probably most guilty, and most famously attributed to Margaret Thatcher (e.g., in Clarkson
(2002), p. ), who said “There is no society, there are only individuals and the state”.  In fact,
while democracy can formally be identified with the existence of  individual rights,
constitutionally guaranteed, I contend that one can only understand the workings of democracy,
and how it differs from dictatorship,  by understanding the role and functioning of groups and the
dynamics of group behaviour.   Thus, throughout, I will emphasize the role of groups and group
competition, sometimes  in sustaining Canadian democracy, sometimes in threatening it.
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section explores the   idea that Canada is
a dictatorship.  Section 3 continues this line of thought by asking the question, if Canada is a
dictatorship, what type is it?  I identified four types in my (1998) book on dictatorship: tinpots,
totalitarians, tyrants, and timocrats.  They behave differently, and so to understand the
implications of thinking of Canada as a dictatorship, one has to understand which type one has in
mind.  Section 4 finally gives up the pretense, openly acknowledges that  Canada is obviously  a
democracy, and asks the question, just how can that be?  That is, what is it that makes Canada
democratic, given that a central feature of democracy, namely electoral competition, seems to be
structurally weak at the federal level.?  Two features are identified as particularly important:
human rights and competition among groups.  Section 5 describes how competition among
groups fosters democracy.  Section 6 then asks if Canada could become undemocratic, and what
kinds of pressures could produce this outcome. I emphasize group pressures for conformity, and
the dynamics of groups, especially the contagiousness of group behaviour, as particular dangers. 
Section 7 concludes the paper.
52.         THE NATURAL GOVERNING PARTY
To begin with,  let us play the game of thinking of Canada as a dictatorship.  The idea is
not completely ridiculous:  There is a natural  governing party, the Liberals.  Much, though
certainly not all,  of the media is controlled by it, if not directly by the Prime Minister, as in
Italy, but by forces loyal to the Liberal party.  The media differ on who should lead the party, but
this is no different from the competition for leadership inside the Communist Party of the Former
Soviet Union, for example. Finally, of course there is opposition to the Liberal Party but this is
fragmented, and there is no serious alternative to the Liberals at the  federal level. 
How do dictatorships work?  The standard view of the difference between democracy and
dictatorship in political science (eg, Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965))  is that dictators can use
the tool of repression to stay in power. Thus dictators typically impose restrictions on the rights
of citizens to criticize the government, restrictions on the freedom of the press, restrictions on the
rights of opposition parties to campaign against the government, or, as is common under
totalitarian dictatorship, simply prohibit groups, associations, or political parties opposed to the
government.  To be effective, these restrictions must be accompanied by monitoring of the
population, and by sanctions for disobedience.  The existence of a political police force and of
extremely severe sanctions for expressing and especially for organizing opposition to the
government such as imprisonment, internment in mental hospitals, torture and execution are the
hallmark of dictatorships of all stripes.  
However, the use of repression creates a problem for the autocrat, and this problem was
the starting point for my own (1990, 1998) work on dictatorship.   This is  the “Dictator's
1Perhaps by the time the reader sees this article, Uncle Jean will have been indeed been
replaced by Uncle Paul.  But competition within the governing party occurs under many
dictatorships, and is not necessarily a sign of democracy.
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Dilemma” -- the difficulty facing any ruler of knowing how much support he has among the
general population, as well as among smaller groups with the power to depose him. The problem
arises from the fact that the use of repression breeds fear on the part of a dictator’s subjects. 
Because they are afraid, they are reluctant to criticize  the dictator's policies. This fear on their
part in turn breeds fear on the part of the dictator, since, not knowing what the population thinks
of his policies, he has no way of knowing what they are thinking and planning, and of course he
suspects that what they are thinking and planning is his assassination. In short, the more the
dictator’s  repressive apparatus stifles dissent and criticism, the less he knows how much support
he really has among the population. Because of this, dictators, just like democratic leaders, have
to build loyal support among groups in the population.
Now Uncle Jean doesn’t suffer from the Dictator’s Dilemma  with the public – he knows
exactly the size of the majority which is eager to see him  leave office1.  And he is unlikely to be
assassinated – that is not the Canadian way!  But within the party he does have exactly this
problem, and individuals within the party, though emboldened recently by his formal
announcement of an end to his reign, have been  famously afraid to criticize the pronouncements
or policies of the leader.   Of course, Uncle Jean is denied the luxury of mounting a show trial in
which Paul Martin is forced to confess his disloyalty and is subsequently liquidated.  
What is the reaction of the Canadian public to this situation?  Though some are agitated, I
think it is fair to say that on the whole they are completely bored by it.  Some political scientists
(e.g., perhaps most famously Almond and Verba (1963)) see the general apathy and boredom of
2For example Anthony Arblaster’s  (1987) text still subscribes to the Rousseau concept
of democracy as a system which implements the “will” of the people.  On the problems
associated with this concept (Here are two: (1) Unless there is unanimity on a particular issue, in
what sense can a the people be said to have a “will”?  (2) And if a dictator did implement a
policy which most of the people approved of, would that regime therefore be a democracy?)  see
the classic discussion by Schumpeter (1943, 1976), chapters 20 and 21..
3Diamond and Plattner (2001), AIntroduction@, p. x 
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the public with politics in many democracies as a sign of democratic strength.  But I don’t find
this reassuring.  Apathy and boredom were the most notable features of the USSR as it entered
into its terminal decline.
In addition, at the federal level, Canada does seem to fail the basic test of democracy, as
formulated in public choice: the capacity to throw out the government.  To elaborate this point,
recall the classic Schumpeter - Downs definition of democracy as Athat institutional arrangement
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide  by means of a
competitive struggle for the people=s vote@ (Schumpeter (1976), p. 269).  This definition is
commonly used today (although it is not the only way of thinking about democracy2).  Thus,
Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner define the minimum requisites of democracy B what they call
electoral democracy-- as a system in which Athe principal positions of political power are filled
through regular, free, and fair elections among competing parties, and it is possible for an
incumbent government to be turned out of office in those elections@.3 Przewroski, et.al.  suggest
that ADemocracy is a system in which incumbents lose elections and leave office when the rules
so dictate.@(Przeworski, et. al.(2000), p.54). 
 Thus, as soon as we consult the classic definition of democracy, it seems  obvious that
Canada is not very democratic.  Of course, it could be argued that if we really wanted to we
4This cannot be the only factor, as it was neither the first nor the last time such deception
was practised on the Canadian public.  From a mountain of possible illustrations, I note Pierre
Trudeau’s implementation of wage and price controls after vigorously campaigning against
them. (I recall the line:“Zap! You’re frozen!” as he mimicked the foolishness of the policy, a line
which may have come back to haunt him after he implemented that very policy.)
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could throw out the Liberals.  But how would we do it?  
 I don’t have anything new to say about what the structural features of Canada are that
have given rise to the dominance of the Liberal party.  It seems clear that this dominance was
considerably strengthened by the collapse of the Conservatives as the result of the trio of 1) the
dishonesty of Mulroney, most notably in campaigning against free trade and subsequently
implementing it4, coupled with the failure of Meech Lake and the Charlottetown accord, which
lost him the Quebec wing of his party in the East and contributed to the rise of Reform in the
West;  2) the ineffectual campaign of Kim Campbell and 3) the return of Joe Clark.  But the
dominance of the Liberals may be exaggerated:  as the section on contagion effects below (6.3)
amplifies, public opinion can sometimes change very rapidly.
3.  THE NORTHERN TIGER
 Given the supremacy of the Liberal party, if Uncle Jean is a dictator, we can ask what
type.  I defined 4 types in my book:  tinpots, who rule with low levels of repression and low
loyalty, and are therefore easily deposed; tyrants, with low loyalty but high repression,
totalitarians, high on both counts, and the possibly mythical case of timocracy, where the ruler
uses little repression, and survives in office because the people are loyal to him.  Almost all
5As cited in the New York Times, October 20, 2002.
6In my 1998 book I used the example of Ancient Rome under the reign of Marcus
Aurelius to illustrate the type, based on Gibbon’s idea that his reign was “the happiest time the
world has ever known”.  Indeed, Aurelius used to say things like “Let every action aim at the
public good.”
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dictators claim to be timocrats, but few, if any are.  Thus Saddam Hussein recently suggested
that the 100% vote in favor of his regime is easy to explain: the Iraqi people simply adore him5. 
Now, Uncle Jean is obviously not a totalitarian. Even the Liberal government doesn’t
have the machinery to put its critics in jail or torture them (although the Prime Minister may 
sometimes succeed in blocking them  from getting a peerage and thus effectively exile them
from the country). 
Nor is he a tinpot.  Tinpots generally are incapable of building a mass party, and the
Liberal party is a hugely successful and long lasting organization, perhaps the most successful
political party in the world today.
Is Canada a timocracy, then?  I repeat that this is a  rare breed, and as  a form of
government not merely extinct.  It probably never existed6. 
This leaves tyranny.  Canada could be like Chile, perhaps, or even better (since that case
is too confrontational to fit the Canadian image), South Korea.  One thing about tyranny is that
of all the types of dictatorship, it is the most likely to be good for economic growth.  In this
context, John Manley’s recent remark referring to Canada as a “northern tiger” acquires new
meaning. 
Of course, the comparison is  insulting.  It is very rare for Canada to quell demonstrations
with  pepper spray or tear gas the way the South Korean government did when the generals were
7Korea’s average annual growth rate of GNP per capita was 8.9% a year from 1955 to
1975, 13.8% from 1975 to 1985 (Kang (2002b, p. 41). From  1990 to 1997 South Korea’s real
GDP grew at over 7% a year (Hong and Lee (2000).  It contracted during the crisis (1998) by
5.8%, but growth returned in 1999.
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in power.  But the comparison is insulting to South Korea too!  Look at those growth rates!7
Moreover, among the most prominent hypotheses about how the tigers achieved that growth  is
the idea that the fruits of growth there are shared (Campos and Root (1996)).  On this line of
thought,  equality is good for growth.  Perhaps Canadian policymakers could take a lesson from
South Korea here.
4.  WHAT MAKES CANADA DEMOCRATIC?
 
Of course, Canada is not a dictatorship of any kind but one of the world’s great
democracies.  Indeed, many of our institutions are admired around the world, perhaps as never
before, and often serve as a model for countries searching for effective models of democratic
institutions (Ignatieff).  But how can this be?  
At the most basic level, Canada is not a dictatorship because the people are not subject to
political repression here.  Nor, I think, could they be repressed in any serious way without
creating a public outcry.  In other words, human rights are entrenched here, and protected by  an
independent judiciary.  While to a considerable extent this has of course been true for a long
time, the arrival of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 seems to have strengthened the
commitment of many Canadians to human rights..   What the Charter explicitly spells out is that
the citizens are supreme, not the government.  At the constitutional level, it is indeed the
question of the rights of the individuals vs that of the state.  The fundamental meaning of Hannah
8Of course, another important reason why Canada is not a dictatorship is the  division of
powers among different levels of government and between the elected government in Parliament
and “independent” agencies like the Bank of Canada.  As this subject is discussed in detail in
Albert Breton’s chapter in this volume, I will not dwell on it further.  I pause only to note that in
real dictatorships, typically the first move by the government is to get rid of competing “centres
of power”, to use Breton’s phrase.
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Arendt’s monumental The Origins of Totalitarianism is that when residual rights reside in the
state, rather than in the individual, that mass persecution becomes possible.  In my view, the
Charter is invaluable  for the development of Canadian democracy and is worth paying the price
of what sometimes appears to be endless litigation over specious  rights claims8.  
Just as secure property rights are the key to economic growth, so secure political rights
are the key to development as a democracy.  The Peruvian scholar Hernando de Soto (2000)
argued that a major obstacle to economic development was what he called “dead capital”.  By
this he meant that even though a piece of property was formally owned by some individual, the
number of obstacles to selling it or altering it in any way were so large that for all practical
purposes the capital was useless.  To take one example, in the Philippines, if a person has built a
dwelling in a settlement on either state-owned or privately owned urban land, to purchase it
legally could necessitate 168 steps, involving 53 public and private agencies and taking 13 to  25
years.  The political analogy might be  “dead rights” like the human rights that were there on
paper in the Former Soviet Union but impossible to exercise. The right to freedom of speech, a
free press  and freedom to organize political movements or parties are not just essential for
democracy ; it is essential that they be specified and enforced by powers independent of the
government.   
Of course, rights such as the  freedom to vote, to organize and to   participate in politics
12
in other ways have existed in theory in democracies such as the US, Canada or the UK for many
years. However, their existence in law is insufficient for their existence in practice, and therefore
for democracy to be complete.   One example is blacks in the U.S. south, who were largely
disenfranchised until the civil rights revolution of the 1960's. Two recent books by Michael
Ignatieff (2000) and Charles Epp (1998)   describe the emergence of these Anew@ rights or the
broadening of political power to new groups -- The Rights Revolution (as they are both titled) --
which has occurred since then in the US, Canada and elsewhere.
Ignatieff traces the emergence of human rights on an international level to the experience
of the Second World War and the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948, the first of a Aspreading canopy@ of laws which altered the balance between individual
sovereignty and individual rights.  With the declaration, the rights of individuals were supposed
to prevail over the rights of states when those states engaged in abominable practices (Ignatieff,
p. 48).
Charles Epp notes that constitutional rights in the past had been primarily the rights of
property and contract.  The “new rights” encompassed, among other rights, the freedom of
speech and the press, free exercise of religion, prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race,
sex,, the right of privacy; and the right to due process in law-enforcement and administrative
procedure (Epp. p. 7).   In Canada, for example, rights cases constituted 13 percent or less of the
[Canadian Supreme] Courts= agenda before 1975 and about 60 percent by 1990. (Epp, p. 172). 
In the United States cases involving the rights of the accused and women=s rights mushroomed
from forming less than 10 percent of all decided cases by the U.S. Supreme Court in the early
1930s to between 45 and 70 percent in the period 1970- 1990 (Epp, p.28).   
9Printed in the Globe and Mail, October 30, 2002, p. A19. 
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In brief, the Charter strengthens the rights of individuals against the state. I find the
notion that someone, somewhere is suing the Canadian government and that others are busy
digging away to find new grounds for doing so enormously comforting.  And in the first
instance, I don’t care what the grounds are, and I find it even more comforting that some person
has found yet another angle to argue that their rights were violated.  
By contrast, in modern Russia, there are indeed elections, and to begin with Putin
probably faced more opposition than Chretien did in the last election.  But human rights are not
entrenched in modern Russia, and one sees the consequences of this in all kinds of ways, such as
the willingness of the government to close down opposition media and to persecute other groups. 
Most recently, one could see it  in the strategy used by the government to combat the terrorist
attack on a Moscow theatre.  The government’s  main aim seemed to be the protection of the
supremacy of the state, rather than the people in the theatre.  Some signs of this are that no plan
had been put in place for the effective treatment of victims of the gas, and indeed the identity of
the gas was not even released to hospitals for a couple of days after the attack ended, preventing
effective treatment.  Government sentiment was nicely expressed by the title of an article  the by
the Russian deputy minister of the interior, Vladimir Vasilyev, “We saved the bulk of the
hostages, and dealt a blow to terror”9.  The word “bulk” aptly characterizes the attitude of a
dictatorship towards its citizens as “stock” rather than as individuals with inalienable human
rights.  Of course, the population apparently supports the Russian government in its war against
terrorists. That is not a sign of democracy but all the more reason to entrench human rights. 
They are there to protect individuals from the state, even when, and perhaps most especially
10Let me emphasize that throughout this paper I am talking about political rights, not
economic rights.
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when, the bulk of the population backs the state.
5. THE GLORY OF GROUP POWER
5.1 Securing human rights
While human rights are essential to democracy10, most individuals would be powerless,
acting by themselves to get them and to keep them.  Consequently groups are necessary both to
obtain these rights and to exercise them.  Whether they view the “new” rights favorably or not,
scholars seem to agree that what made them possible was not just the arrival of the Charter, but
of what Epp calls a Asupport structure for legal mobilization@, consisting of rights advocacy
organizations, willing and able lawyers, financial aid of various types, and in some countries,
governmental rights enforcement agencies. Epp puts the case for this in a straightforward
manner: 
A Ordinary individuals typically do not have the time, money or expertise necessary to
support a long-running lawsuit through several layers of the judicial system. ...at the level
of  the individual cases, the cost of pursuing a rights case has  usually exceeded any
monetary award to the plaintiffs [at least in the early phases of the rights revolution] so
lawyers have had little monetary incentive to take such cases on a contingency basis. 
11See for example the classic papers by Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) or Olson’s (1982)
book. 
12Tullock (1967) or Posner (1971)
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Organized rights advocates, however, have developed a range of sources of support......
and have made them available to potential rights claimants.  These sources of support......
form what I called the support structure for  legal mobilization. (Epp, p.18-19).
Thus,  the existence of effective human rights is due to the presence of activists who
make it possible for individuals in large groups who might otherwise face an insoluble free rider
problem to obtain their rights.  This includes groups as diverse as women’s groups, gays and
lesbians, aboriginals, criminals, and many ethnic groups.  Of course, rights are still incomplete in
Canada and to that extent we are not a perfect democracy.
5.2 Competition among groups
What do economic models say about group competition?  Early work in the “Chicago
School”11 argued that interest group competition is inefficient because the policies typically
demanded by interest groups are inefficient and wasteful.  In  “rent-seeking” models12 it is the
contest itself which is inefficient and wasteful.  However, Becker (1983) showed that democratic
politics does take account of the losses from inefficient policies.  To see his point, suppose we
can divide the population into “winners” and “losers” from government policies.  Then it follows
that the  larger the losses from a policy, the more the groups who lose by it will oppose it, and
16
the less likely it is to be adopted.. Alternatively the smaller the gains from a subsidy, the less the
“winners” (the group which gains from the subsidy) will exert pressure to obtain it. 
Consequently, the democratic contest is not wasteful; on the contrary, it tends to select efficient
(good) over inefficient (bad) policies. Thus, as bad as many of the policies of the Liberal
government might seem to some, these policies won out over worse policies!
Note that competitive elections are not necessary for this result, and indeed in Becker’s
theoretical model there are no elections, only interest group pressures.  What is necessary that
the pressures from both sides are taken into account, that groups which can exert more pressure
be relatively successful in getting their policies adopted, and that pressures do accurately
represent the social value of gains and losses. 
We will return to the last qualification in the next section.  But first, to see the basic
argument  in a different way, let us apply this way of thinking to the case of political
dictatorship. It can immediately be seen that the tendency for competition to select efficient
policies is severely attenuated. The reason lies in the dictator’s capacity to silence dissent and to
repress the losers from the  regime’s policies. These powers are unavailable to democratic
politicians. Autocrats typically  ban dissenting political organizations, refuse to permit their
views to appear in the media, refuse to allow them to meet or organize, and jail, torture or even
execute their leaders. The result is that there is no reason why efficient policies would be
adopted. For example, Saddam Hussein could end his various weapons programs and in other
ways adopt policies that would result in the sanctions against the regime being lifted.  But the
losers from sanctions under Saddam Hussein are repressed, and the small group of producers
13See Kaempfer, Lowenberg and Mertens (2001)  for details
14Newer, dynamic models of democratic decision- making cast doubts on the efficiency
of democracy in a dynamic context. The basic problem discussed there (e.g., in Besley and Coate
(1998) is the inability of a representative democracy to commit to future policy outcomes. The
question from the point of view of this paper is of course, whether a dictatorship could be
expected to do better in this respect.  To my knowledge nothing has been written on this issue
but it is worth noting the evidence in Przeworski et al. that the average life of a dictatorship is
less than democracy.  Moreover, dictatorship does not enshrine outcomes; democracy does.  For
example, Jorge Dominguez (2001) shows that the turnaround to market friendly policies in
Argentina, Chile and elsewhere in Latin America was only consolidated when successive
democratically elected regimes agreed to the policy.  As he puts it “Only democracy can commit
to the future” (p.252).
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who benefit from the sanctions13 are the winners in the game played under his regime.
It is worth repeating that for the competitive mechanism to work in Canada, the Liberal
party would have to be open to pressures from all of the different groups in society.  And it is
easy to see the  role of the Charter here. It is twofold.  First, and most important, it prevents the
Liberal party from silencing its critics.  Second, it opens up a second front (the courts) for the
competition among interest groups, and to the extent that the Liberal party is closed to pressures
from certain groups, which do not form part of its majority coalition, the Charter makes it
possible for the public sector to take their preferences into account. In general,  the more every
group is represented in the competition for public policies, and the fairer their representation, the
more likely it is that the correct policies will be adopted. Of course, Canada is not a perfect
democracy.  It would be, though, on this way of thinking, if  every group is represented, and
their “weight” in the allocation of public policies exactly represented their weight in the
population, just as we would like in a perfect democracy. 
To conclude, it is worth emphasizing that in these simple static models14, competition
among interest groups is efficient from the economic point of view.  If there were a better way of
allocating rights to Quebec, for example, the political process would tend to find it.  That is, a
18
political party or any other group which can invent a new solution which gives Quebec more in
the way of group rights at lower cost to ROC, or to aboriginals or women at lower cost to the rest
of society will see the government leap on and adopt this solution.
6.  WHAT COULD MAKE CANADA UNDEMOCRATIC: THE DANGERS
OF GROUP POWER
With the framework outlined in the previous section in mind, it is worth considering the
kinds of things which can go wrong in democratic politics.
6.1 Asymmetries: those left out, and those who are always in
The basic  problem is that in real democracies the power of groups is typically unequal.
One kind of asymmetry arises when some are left out in the competition among groups for public
policies.   For a number of reasons, politicians are not "open" to bids from all groups but tend to
have long term arrangements with certain groups. One reason is ideology.  An example is the
Conservative revolution in Ontario.  It would have been difficult to imagine that the Ontario
teacher’s union, for example, could have become among the main supporters of the government,
and the recipient of favorable government policies, no matter how much they might have offered
in terms of campaign funds.  Another example is Canadian federal prisoners, whom the federal
Liberal government had deemed unworthy of the right to vote. Presumably the government
thought there were more votes to be had from excluding this group than from allowing them
15Of 819 claims presented by organized interests between 1988 and 1998 to the Supreme
Court, 468 were brought by corporate interests. The next largest groups were “Charter
Canadians” who brought 80, aboriginals (77), and labour interests (58) (Hein (2001), p. 223.
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basic democratic rights.  The Supreme Court has recently, and entirely correctly, on my view,
over-ruled the Liberal party on this point and restored this right. 
Groups which are excluded sometimes take dramatic actions to try and demonstrate that
they are not willing to live with this situation.  Normal “bidding” being closed, their leaders may
resort to theatre, to shock, to radical positions and even to violation of existing norms, in order to
be "heard".  As Uncle Jean has himself  mentioned in some oft noted remarks, it is not surprising
that those who are left out of the prosperity that has accrued to the winners in the globalization
game may act in ways that are a threat to the world’s democracies.
 Many of the groups that Morton and Knopff refer to collectively as  “the Court Party”
are composed of or represent those who have been left out or who have been disadvantaged in
domestic policymaking or domestic society: criminals,  gays and lesbians, refugees, prisoners,
women, aboriginal groups, and so forth. In any case, Gregory  Hein ( 2001) has produced some
evidence that seems to invalidate the Morton and Knopff thesis: by far the largest number of
Charter cases brought to the Supreme Court are not brought by groups who make up “the Court
party” but by corporations15.  Still, my guess, and it is only a guess, is that, despite this, the
charter still tilts in the direction of equalizing political power among citizens and groups, and
also of  equalizing it between citizens and the government.  That is, the situation would be even
more favorable to corporations and to the government in the absence of the Charter.
This brings us to the second problem, which arises if some groups have too much power. 
The group most often accused of this in Canada is the corporations. To the extent that
16Stephen Clarkson suggests that this is how we got NAFTA’s  chapter 11.  Of course,
the details of the deal were subsequently made public and it could be argued that the electorate
could have repudiated them at the next election.  However, this assumes such deals are easily
reversible.  One could argue that in such cases (where secrecy may be necessary to conduct
negotiations) the electoral mechanism is inadequate and should be supplemented by popular
referenda.
20
corporations and the government  work in tandem and in secret16, aggravated by the first past the
post electoral system, which gives the median voter and the majority party a disproportionate
amount of power, we may not be back in South Korea under the generals (General Jean?), but we
are headed that way. 
Recent work on South Korea illuminates the causes of the spectacular growth in that
country.  Oddly enough, as David Kang has demonstrated convincingly (2002a, 2002b), one of
the main causes of this growth appears to be the massive  corruption of the government. Not all
the tigers were as corrupt as South Korea, (for example, they are all over the map in their scores
on the  Transparency International Index).  But in South Korea there was an alliance between big
business (chaebols) and government in which the chaebols bribed the governing party on a very
large scale. The policies pursued bore no relation to the “Washington consensus.”   Of course,
corruption is not unknown in Canada. But it is inconceivable that the Bank of Canada, for
example, would act as the “bagman” for the Liberal party the way the Bank of Korea did for the
Democratic Republican Party of Korea (Kang (2002a), p. 187).
6.2  Declining Social Capital, Trust and Conformity
Another way of looking at the “health” of a democracy which has recently become
fashionable is to examine the state of “trust” or “social capital” among the citizens, and by
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citizens in the government.  Putnam’s  work (eg, 1993, 2000) on social capital has received a lot
of attention, and provides a convenient place to start our inquiry.  Putnam believes social capital
is good for democracy and for society.  Indeed, he has said that “happiness is living in a society
where horizontal trust is high.” In Making Democracy Work (1993), he argued that social capital
is  beneficial for governing capacity.  In his  latest book Bowling Alone (2000) he deploys a
battery of indicators to show that social capital has been steadily falling in the U.S. since the
1960s.   The evidence that social capital in the U.S. has fallen  is compelling,  but the analysis of
why this has happened appears less so.  The main reasons appear to be the growth of television
consumption and “generational change”--  a catch all phrase referring to the passing of the “great
civic generation” born in the years 1925-30 and who became adults during the 1950s.  There is
no doubt that many of the correlations Putnam presents  are fascinating, especially the ones
between those who agree relatively strongly with the statement “Tv is my primary form of
entertainment” and various measures of of civic engagement, such as the number of club
meetings attended, whether the person worked on a community project, and  even the mean
number of times  a driver “gave the finger” to another driver last year.
The approach has been  applied to other countries as well (see Pharr and Putnam (2000).
However the correlations with the tv variable for other countries are tiny (Norris,  in Pharr and
Putnam ( 2000)).   I have seen no detailed estimates for Canada.  
 A related problem uncovered by the social capital school is that, increasingly, in Western
democracies, no one seems to trusts the government any more. And  there seems to be no doubt
that satisfaction with government is falling while the size of governments have been  rising in
many democracies. (Alesina, et. al. in Pharr and Putnam (2000)). The implication often drawn is
that governing capacity has fallen.  
17The level of interpersonal trust among Canadians appears, along with that in the Nordic
countries, to rank among the highest in the countries listed in Inglehart’s charts. 
18See for example Knoke=s Political Networks (1990 ), p. 71
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 Lack of trust, both in one’s fellow citizens and in the government, is a central
characteristic of dictatorships.  This is sometimes referred to as the “vacuum effect” between the
leader and the population. To illustrate, contemporary Russia is not a dictatorship but it hardly
lives up to the democratic ideal.  A Russian scholar, Anton Oleinik, entitles one of his papers on
Russia “A Trustless Society” (Oleinik (n.d.)). He reports surveys for 1999 in which only 3.4% of
the respondents think that they can trust the state.  Indeed, Oleinik suggests that it was the “non-
reciprocal behaviour of the state confirmed during the August 1998 crisis [which] led to a
dramatic decline of  the citizens’ willingness to pay the taxes.” (Oleinik, n.d., p. 22).  By contrast
people in Canada do trust each other to a remarkable extent17 (Inglehart (1999), p.102) .
A related problem with groups arises from their internal dynamics.  In groups where the
individual’s welfare depends positively on the average level of effort or participation, each
member has an incentive to “free ride” on the contributions of others.  Group leaders will
typically want to take steps to counter this behaviour.  One strategy which is often practised by
the leaders of  many extremist groups is to deliberately create mistrust  between the membership
of the sect and the rest of society.  By making it more difficult  for the members to associate with
the rest of society, the leader hopes to increase their participation in and dependence on the
group.  Religious sects and cults often try to limit the information available to members in order
to successfully control them, and control association with outsiders in order to do this as well.18 
But strategies like these are not only used by sects; they are often practised by mainstream ethnic
groups as well.  The upshot is that  within ethnic groups there is often great pressure for
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conformity.  One of the great virtues and responsibilities of democracy is to protect the rights of
individuals against group pressures of this kind.  
 Pressures like these were most apparent in Yugoslavia under Milosevic. Some think it
would be impossible that what happened there could ever take place in Canada.  Ethnic groups in
Canada do not try to wipe each other out as they did in Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. But it is worth
remembering that Yugoslavians are not necessarily warlike, that indeed that Serbs and Croatians 
lived in peace there for many years and that there was no overt nationalism in Yugoslavia. 
Instead it exploded, because nationalism can be contagious (see section 6.3 below).
Perhaps this point about group pressures on individuals suggests a different explanation
for Putnam’s evidence about the decline of solidarity in the U.S.  It’s worth recalling after all
that what Putnam labels “the great civic generation of the 1950s”  was noted also for its
conformity.  The 1950s  witnessed little in the way of attempts to break up discrimination against
blacks. 1947 saw the release of the film Gentleman’s Agreement, which described the process by
which  Jews were excluded from the mainstream of American society.  American society
presented a homogeneous front, it was preoccupied with the fight against communism [in which
Elia Kazan, the director of the film Gentleman’s Agreement, took part by testifying to the House
Un-American activities Committee], and dissent or alternative lifestyles were not particularly
welcome.  
Solidarity in the United States  has partially returned now that a new external threat has
appeared.  Whatever the causes, it is hard to argue that the effect has been healthy for American
democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic Democracy in America  is often referred to in studies
of social capital.  Indeed, Putnam (2000) refers to him as its “patron saint” for the way in which
he glowingly spoke about the American proclivity to join associations.  However, de Tocqueville
19In the New York Times Magazine, October 20, 2002, p. 64)
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also described  America as “the most conformist society he had ever seen.” In my view,
conformity and the proclivity to join associations are related. 
Today the man in the grey flannel suit has been replaced by the imperial CEO, to use
Krugman’s19 phrase, and the CEO’s backstabbing underlings. It is hard to be salutary about the
decline of trust in the workplace, but I don’t see the decreased faith in authority as a threat to
democracy.  Moreover the increased litigiousness in Canada as a result of the Charter appears to
me to be a good thing, to use Martha Stewart’s phrase.  
6.3  Contagion
There is one proposition about social capital which has not yet been noted, and which
gives us further insight into the role of groups.  This is that  social capital is contagious: like any
other form of “network externality”, its value is larger, the larger the stock. Thus social capital is
like computer software.  The more that others have it, the more valuable it is and the more any
individual will want it and be willing to take steps to preserve it.
The contagion property is particularly important in politics, where genuine  information
is weak and the incentive to collect it is not there because of the free rider problem.  Indeed, it is
well known that ideas and political support are contagious: hence the name: bandwagon effects. 
In general,  bandwagons and  fads can be explained in terms of the desire for social cohesion.
People often adopt an idea or join a political movement in order to be “in”, that is, to be either in
the vanguard of or at least a part of the group or movement that promotes the idea.  It need have
20See Wintrobe (1998) and references therein.
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nothing to do with the logical case for the idea (if any) at all. Thus, there has never really has
been a  case on esthetic, medical  or logical grounds for hula hoops in the 1950's, tie-dyed tee
shirts in the 1960's, disco culture in the 70's, backward baseball caps (the 80's)  or wearing
earrings in your tongue (the 90's, and growing).  In the same way, the more everyone else seems
to favor Paul Martin as the new leader of the Liberal Party (“Uncle Paul”), the more any
individual tends to favour it as well.  On the other hand, the contagion property means that the
Liberal hold on power may be more tenuous than might be thought, as small events might cause
a loss of confidence and a massive turning away from the party.
One might object that where there is lots of social capital, i.e., lots of horizontal
associations a la Putnam, this acts as a bulwark against instability. But that may be exactly
wrong: there is some evidence that the more social capital there is, the more unstable the polity. 
The classic example is the  Weimar Republic.  It was thought Hitler rose because Germany was
an “atomized” society with few individuals members of groups or voluntary associations–but in
fact exactly the opposite was true: Germany was particularly rife with horizontal associations,
i.e.,   there was lots of social capital in precisely Putnam’s (2000) sense in Weimar Germany20!! 
Perhaps most important, many of the groups themselves joined the Hitler movement as a group,
encouraged by their leaders.  And these were not necessarily groups of uneducated individuals,
easily prey to simplistic and vicious political ideas: among the first groups to declare their
loyalty to the Nazis  were the medical doctors.
It follows that, paradoxically, the more social capital there is, the greater the demand for
constitutional protections in the form of checks and balances.  One important application of these
21James Madison, Federalist Paper no. 49, p. 317, quoted in Page and Shapiro (1989), p.
57.
22Federalist Paper no. 71, p. 432, quoted in Page and Shapiro (1989), p. 57
23The most successful solution to a social problem that I know of also originates with the
contagion  property of groups,  namely the “Fixing Broken Windows” approach to crime
prevention first applied in the New York Transit Authority, and subsequently implemented in
New York City.  Indeed, “zero tolerance” might be worth trying as a solution to problems of
political and corporate corruption.  But racial profiling and other stigmatizing policies which
were later adopted in New York are obviously anti- democratic.  And they contradict the spirit of
the “Broken Windows” approach, which emphasized the importance of having the community
onside in fighting crime (see Kelling and Wilson (1982) or Kelling and Coles (1996)).  Indeed,
perhaps the closest life in Canada could get to life under dictatorship occurs if people were to be 
arrested for no reason other than their skin color.
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ideas is to the reasoning of Madison and others in The Federalist Papers about the design of the
American Constitution.  There the case for a constitution is made on grounds of the instabilities
due to passions.  And one big source of instability was said to be bandwagon effects, especially
under the influence of the wrong kind of political leaders.  Hence Madison’s statement that “it is
the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to be controlled and regulated by the government. 
The passions ought to be controlled and  regulated by the government”21
The Founding Fathers were especially worried about demagoguery: the notion that
citizens could be “misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men”,   or by the “wiles
of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate.” 22
As far as the contemporary United States is concerned, this reasoning shows  why  the
decline of social capital in the United States could have been so precipitous as it appears in
Putnam’s charts: since it is contagious, once it starts to decline the process sets up expectations
which are self fulfilling.  And there are also applications to other problems and to other
societies23.  Thus, in in Russia, the fall of the communist system left lots of social capital, now
unconnected to the Communist hierarchy, and these connections gave birth to the oligarchic
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capitalism and weak democracy of contemporary Russia.  The same type of phenomenon
allowed Slobodan Milosevic to pit one ethnic group against another and launch four wars in
order to sustain his rule in post communist Yugoslavia.
6.4  Globalization, the United States and group dynamics
If Canada can be compared to a dictatorship, what about the hereditary monarchy next
door? And what about globalization? Do these powerful forces threaten Canadian democracy?
These matters are obviously complex.  One reason for considering them together is that to some
extent they act in opposing ways. Thus, on the one hand, globalization is to a considerable extent
driven by the US and US institutions (Friedman (1999)).  But globalization also  makes it easier
for small countries like Canada to build coalitions with other countries against the United States
(Clarkson). Similarly, I have already argued that domestic corporate power is a threat to
democracy.  But globalization reduces the power of this group.  Finally, globalization obviously
acts as a check on Uncle Jean by tying the hands of the Canadian government in many ways. 
Conversely, it could be argued that the strength of the Liberal party makes it easier  to resist
American demands. And nothing appears to build solidarity among Canadians better than  anti -
Americanism.
While I cannot sort all these forces out in a couple of pages here, some things do stand
out.  First of all, and most obviously, free trade agreements like NAFTA does imply that the
Canadian government has ceded its power to supranational organizations.  Democracy is
particularly threatened when provisions of these agreements are made with the assistance of
24Clarkson, 2002, gives some examples.
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some groups and not others. Of course, supranational organizations also act as a check on the
power of the United States, as mentioned above, but there would seem to be a net loss of
democratic decision making power under many circumstances24.   Second, fundamental  to
globalization is the increased feasibility  for companies to diversify production internationally.
That is, globalization results in  an increase in the elasticity of demand for labor as firms can
increasingly substitute foreign for domestic labour (Rodrik (1997).  In this way,  globalization
can undermine group domestic bargains which make it possible for various groups to live
together.  As Rodrik points out, the consequence is a withdrawal from these understandings and
the undermining of solidarity or social cohesion in the society (Rodrik (1997)). Globalization
also detaches the CEO from relations within the firm, inflates  executive salaries and gives the
firm a greater incentive to substitute non-specific for specific  human capital.  Put differently,
and more simply, both of these factors imply that the firm=s demand for trust within the firm falls
(Wintrobe (2000))
Globalization thus appears to reduce solidarity (trust) within the society.  To understand
the ramifications of this more deeply, let us look more carefully at how solidarity is built. 
Broadly speaking, there are three ways to generate group solidarity: 
(1) The first is through mechanisms that ensure equality among the group such as
common pensions, medicare, etc.  The more everyone receives exactly the same treatment, the
less energy individuals in the group will put into trying to increase their  own advantage at the
expense of the group and the more they will put into seeking benefits for the group.  Of course
free riding will limit the extent to which individuals will work for the group’s advantage but, as a
25For more details, see Wintrobe (1995)
26 I leave it to another occasion to consider the individual rationality of this response. 
After September 11th, it is particularly hard for North Americans to maintain that it does not
29
substantial literature now demonstrates, there are various ways to overcome the free rider
problem, including mobilization through networks and social ties (Opp and Hartmann (1989)),
and  group leadership and the promise of rewards from successful action ( Uhlaner (1989),
Morton (1991), Chong (1991), Shachar (1999).  Given a constant level of these incentives, more
equality of treatment within the group means more solidarity and more effort directed at group
goals. 
 (2) Group solidarity will also be larger, the larger the barriers to entry and exit from the
group.  The reasoning is similar:  the harder it is to leave the group, the more members will be
motivated to take measures that take care of it.  The more membership is restricted, the less it
will be felt that any improvement in the group=s fortunes will be dissipated through opportunistic
entry.  Thus, the peculiar solidarity of ethnic groups comes from the fact that entry to and often
exit from the group are essentially blocked25.  Other groups find other ways to limit entry: among
these must be included obfuscating the way the group works to outsiders, including in- group
rituals and practices and in- group signals and symbolism.   Such practices and make it more
difficult for members of the group to interact pleasurably with outsiders and raise the value of in-
group interaction.  
(3) Finally, and most obviously, group solidarity is most famously built through group
jihad, defined as struggle against an external enemy, whether another nation, ethnic group,
civilization, etc.  Solidarity tends to be greater, the larger the perceived threat to individuals in
the group from outside26.
exist.
27According to Paul Krugman (2002), more than one half of the Bush tax cut will go to
the top 1% of families within the United States (p.77)
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To summarize,  barriers to entry and exit, mechanisms to ensure equality and struggle
against an external enemy are three alternative methods to raise solidarity.  It follows that if one
of the mechanisms becomes more costly to use, one or both of the others will be substituted for
it.  Globalization reduces the capacity to generate solidarity via the mechanisms of equality of
treatment within the group, or raising barriers to entry and exit.  It follows that the demand for
solidarity via struggle against some external enemy is increased.  Thus, as Benjamin Barber has
argued in his prescient book, Jihad vs McWorld (1995), globalization (McWorld) and jihad are
not necessarily opposing forces.  In some ways, McWorld stimulates jihad.  The mechanism just
described is one way in which this can happen.
Jihad is the greatest threat to democracy.  Jihad tends to make the large group behave
like the small group and crushes internal differences.  It is a favorite tool of dictators–indeed this
is probably the main way Saddam Hussein stays in power.  But its use is not limited to
dictatorship.  With George II granting enormous tax cuts to the rich27 even as income inequality
in the United States reaches heights not seen for over 60 years (Krugman 2002), internal
solidarity might become frayed at the edges, and an external enemy is more desirable than ever. 
Canada and the European welfare states build solidarity by providing pensions, medicare,
unemployment insurance and so forth.  The United States has fewer of these and considerably
more inequality and real poverty (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001)).  The welfare state thus
protects democracy within a country by insulating it against the desire for jihad.
 The process of globalization, which to some extent spreads American style values
28To the extent that there are other ways to raise solidarity besides the three discussed
here, other substitutes might be found besides jihad.  However, the mechanisms identified do
seem to me to be the main ones available.  For more details on this subject see Wintrobe (2002)
(b).
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(Friedman (1999)) of small government and flexible labor markets makes it more difficult for
other countries to sustain different systems.  If they do lose them, they may find that if their
citizens have a real demand for solidarity, as I am suggesting in this paper, jihad might have to
take its place28.   On this line of reasoning, it may be no accident that the previous peak of
globalization occurred just before World War I.
7.  CONCLUSION
Canada is not a dictatorship, despite what sometimes appears to be a near - monopoly of
federal power by the Liberal party.  The main reason is that human rights are entrenched in
Canada, most notably by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Other mitigating factors include
competition from the provinces and municipalities, and a free press.  Most of all, I have
emphasized the role of groups in obtaining and maintaining and enhancing individual rights and
freedoms. I have also suggested that  group competition is efficient- that is, it will result in the
best policies being adopted by the government.  By contrast,  competition among groups does not
exist under dictatorship, where groups who oppose the policies of the government are typically
repressed.  Still, the “allure” of dictatorship remains, and is perhaps never stronger when it can be
argued that a “little bit” of dictatorship is good for economic growth, or fighting terrorism.
The functioning of groups is not always salutary.  Rather, the greatest danger to
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democracy lies in the pressures for conformity that are characteristic of the internal workings of
groups. The internal workings of terrorist groups often illustrate this precisely.   The danger to
democracy is amplified by the fact that conformity is contagious. This is one explanation for how
social capital could have declined so precipitously in the US. I know of no evidence that social
capital is declining in Canada and indeed, the opposite might be true, perhaps because of the
incentives provided by the Charter to participate in group politics.  And I do not see “Charter
politics” as a threat to democracy in any case – rather, the increased litigiousness of Canadians as
a result of the Charter appears to me a sign of democratic health.  
While Canada is not a dictatorship, democracy is never something to be taken for granted
and can always be improved.  I have suggested two main lines of thought about this in this paper. 
The first one is that I think it is worth paying the price of occasionally spurious litigation to
spread political rights more equally among citizens.  From this point of view, the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms is the best thing that has happened to Canadian democracy.  Secondly, I
have emphasized that understanding the role of groups and group dynamics is vital to an
understanding of how democracies work.  Groups are necessary for individuals to obtain
individual rights.  But group behaviour can  also produce a stampede to dictatorship.  In sum,
understanding group behaviour helps us to understand what the “glue” is that holds a society
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